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Abstract
This paper highlights the role of hatred and its evolution in determining the nature of
peace between groups, or nations, after reaching, and while implementing, truce. It
proposes that weak inertia, diminishing memory of hatred and low propensity to
reciprocate hatred are essential for reaching a genuine and stable peace. In the case of
mutual abstinence from violence, genuine peace process prevails if both groups have
sufficiently weak inertia and strongly diminishing memories of hatred and low
propensities to reciprocate hatred. When these conditions are not satisfied, genuine
peace may still be reached if one of the groups has weak inertia and strongly
diminishing memory of hatred. Strong inertia, persistent memories of hatred and high
propensities to reciprocate hatred are obstacles for reaching genuine and stable peace
between groups and nations.
Keywords: Conflict; Hatred; Inertia; Compassion; Genuine peace

1. Introduction
In many regions and countries the population is divided by factors such as origin,
culture, religion and race into rival nations, or groups. Conflicts between these
nations, or groups, constitute a major aspect of their coexistence. The literature on
conflicts between nations (external conflicts) stresses political and economic factors
that may influence the likelihood of wars. For instance, Grafinkel [8] has studied the
interactions between domestic politics and international conflicts and argued that
political party competition associated with electoral uncertainty leads to a decline in
military spending, and that democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible
“pre-commitment” mechanism that moderates conflict between nations. Hess and
Orphaniedes [11] have disputed the idea that democracy and democratic institutions
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moderate conflicts and frequency of wars between nations. Bearce and Fisher [1] and
Dorussen [5] have argued that there is an inverse relationship between trade and war.
Nafziger and Auvinen [12] have shown that income inequality and pervasive rentseeking by ruling elite are linked to war. Hess and Orphanides [10] have stressed the
role of recessions in triggering external conflicts. The literature on violent conflicts
between groups (internal conflicts) has emphasized the roles of political-economic
factors, ideology, ethnicity and religion. For example, Blomberg and Hess [2] have
argued that recession combined with external conflict increases the probability of
internal conflict. Collier and Hoeffler [3] [4] have argued that civil wars are motivated
either by greed for private gains or by grievance stemming from autocracy, ethnic and
religious differences, and poor economic performance. Elbadawi and Sambanis [6]
have found that democracy is negatively associated with civil violence and that the
prevalence of civil war is positively associated with ethnic fragmentation. ReynalQuerol [13] have concluded that religious differences constitute a social cleavage that
is more important than linguistic differences in the development of civil wars and that
democracy significantly reduces the incidence of civil wars between ethnic groups.
Despite differences and rivalry, abstinence from violence, and even cooperation, are
possible outcomes of a conflict. Skaperdas [14] has demonstrated that there is a
possibility of cooperation between rival groups when the probabilities of winning an
armed conflict are significantly different and when the groups’ marginal contributions
to useful production are similar. Grossman and Kim [9] have analyzed a general
equilibrium model of resource allocation to appropriation and productive activities
and highlighted a non-aggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to
offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secured.
This paper argues that cessation of violence is a necessary condition, but not a
sufficient one, for reaching a stable, genuine peace between rival groups, or nations. It
highlights the role of hatred and its persistence, or dissolution, in shaping the nature of
peace between groups. In addition to formal agreements, genuine and stable peace
requires the dissolution of hatred between groups. In particular, the paper attempts to
identify the conditions for convergence to a stable and genuine peace between two
groups following a cessation of violence. The co-evolution of hatred between two
groups, or nations, is parsimoniously presented by a system of two differential
equations. A similar approach has been used by Faria [7] to describe the possible
mutual evolution of the rival populations of Neanderthals and modern Homo Sapiens.
The inherent nature of the peace between the groups is diagnosed by identifying the
asymptotic properties of the system’s steady state. The analysis suggests that strong
inertia, persistent memories of hatred and high propensities to reciprocate hatred
prevent rival groups from reaching a genuine and stable peace.

2. Formulation of hatred evolution and genuine peace process
Consider a situation where two groups, or nations, A and B, do not trust one another
and are engaged in a violent conflict. The evolution of A’s hatred of B (denoted
by H A with negative values representing A’s level of affection of B) and the
evolution of B’s hatred of A (denoted by H B with negative values representing B’s
level of affection of A) are displayed by a differential equation system which, for
simplicity, is taken to be first order and linear:
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dH tA
= α 11 H tA + α 12 H tB + β1Vt B
(1)
dt
dH tB
(2)
= α 21 H tA + α 22 H tB + β 2Vt A .
dt
In this system, t is a continuous time index,1 Vt A is the intensity of A’s violence
against B at t, Vt B is the intensity of B’s violence against A at t, β 1 and β 2 are
parameters reflecting the effects of each group’s violence on the evolution of its
counterpart’s hatred, and α 11 , α 12 , α 21 , and α 22 are the elements of the equationsystem’s state-transition matrix.2
The parameters α 11 and α 22 reflect the effects of the current hatred level of each
group on the evolution of its hatred of the counterpart. The sign and size of each of
these parameters depend on two opposite factors associated with the current level of
this destructive mental state. One factor is the group’s collective habitual propensity
to hate its counterpart—inertia. The other is the group’s instantaneous weakening of
this mental state that is caused by a fading collective memory of hatred of the
opponent. Hence, α 11 and α 22 are, positive if the respective group’s hatred-inertia
dominates the group’s diminishing memory of hatred of its counterpart. They are
zero, or even negative, otherwise. In many instances, physical factors (such as
disputed territories and natural resources) and cultural and religion differences serve
as permanent reminders.
The parameter α 12 indicates the effect of group B’s level of hatred of group A on
the evolution of group A’s hatred of group B. Similarly, α 21 indicates the effect of
group A’s level of hatred of group B on the evolution of group B’s hatred of group A.
That is, α 12 reflects the collective propensity of the people of group A to reciprocate
hatred toward group B and α 21 reflects the collective propensity of the people of
group B to reciprocate hatred toward group A. These parameters are inversely related
to the groups’ ability to behave compassionately.
In this formulation, a genuine peace process is defined as a course of affair between
group A and group B that is free of violence ( V A = 0 = V B ) and reflecting a trend of
diminishing mutual hatred from the initial positive levels ( H 0A , H 0B > 0 ). Cessation of
violence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for having a genuine peace
process. That is, although the steady state (SS) of the differential equation-system (1)
and (2) associated with V A = 0 = V B is free of hatred ( H ssA = 0 = H ssB ), there is not
necessarily convergence to this steady state. The nature of the A-B peace process is
identified by the characteristic roots of the state-transition matrix of the homogeneous
part of the aforementioned linear differential equation system:

1

Alternatively, time can be taken to be discrete and the evolution of hatred can be depicted by a system
of difference equations.
2
By subtracting from the right-hand-sides of equation (1) and equation (2) factors representing the
stationary effect of economically, culturally and politically positive exchanges between the two groups,
the system can be broadened to generate a steady state with mutual affection ( H ss , H ss < 0 ).
A

B
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λ1, 2 = 0.5{(α 11 + α 22 ) ± (α 11 + a 22 ) 2 − 4(α 11α 22 − α 12α 21 ) } .
14444442444444
3

(3)

Δ

When these characteristic roots are negative, or conjugate complex pair with a
negative real part, the hatred-free steady state, H ssA = 0 = H ssB , is asymptotically
stable. That is, cessation of violence starts a genuine peace process between group A
and group B.

3. Conclusion
When A and B mutually abstain from violence, genuine peace process prevails if:
i.
A and B have sufficiently weak inertia and strongly diminishing
memories of hatred so that α 11 , α 22 < 0 , and
ii.
A’s and B’s propensities to reciprocate hatred ( α 12 , α 21 ≥ 0 ) are
sufficiently low so that α 11α 22 > α 12α 21 .
Conditions i and ii ensure that the characteristic roots are either negative or
constituting a conjugate complex pair with a negative real part. In the first case, the
hatred-free steady state is a proper node. In the second case, the hatred-free steady
state is approachable along a spiralling path. When the groups’ propensities to
reciprocate aversion are such that α 11α 22 − 0.25(α 11 + α 22 ) 2 < α 12α 21 < α 11α 22 , there
is convergence to the hatred-free steady state between A and B from any initial level
of mutual hatred. If the groups’ propensities to reciprocate aversion are sufficiently
low so that α 12α 21 < α 11α 22 − 0.25(α 11 + α 22 ) 2 (i.e., Δ < 0 ), the convergence to the
hatred-free steady between A and B from any initial level of mutual hatred is along a
bumpy road—an oscillating path displaying periods of mutual hatred, one-sided
hatred, and mutual affection.

When conditions i and ii are not satisfied, genuine peace can still be reached if one
of the groups has weak inertia and strongly diminishing memory of hatred. In
particular, there exists two stable manifolds along which the groups’ levels of hatred
continually decrease as long as one of these groups has weak inertia and strongly
diminishing memory of hatred so that, despite the inertia-dominated generation of
hatred by the other group, α 11 + α 22 < 0 . In this case, only one of the groups has a
dominant, strongly diminishing collective memory (i.e., either α 11 < 0 and α 22 > 0 ,
or vice versa). Recalling the assumption that α 12 , α 21 ≥ 0 , α 11α 22 − α 12α 21 < 0 and
consequently

Δ > α 11 + α 22 . Given that α 11 + α 22 < 0 , λ1 > 0 whereas λ2 < 0 .

Hence the hatred-free steady state is a saddle point. That is, there exist two convergent
arms to H ssA = 0 = H ssB from mutual, not necessarily the initial, combinations of
hatred.
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